Educating a plural demos

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Abstract

This article looks at the relationship between education and democracy and, drawing from republican political theory, examines the civic potential of the first pan-European citizenship education programme, which aims to encourage the young to participate in democratic life at both societal and school levels. It also revisits the dynamics of European party political evolution and the opportunities it offers for civic engagement. All the above can contribute to the making of a *civitas Europaea,* composed of multiple democratic publics and conscious of their collective civic identity.

Preface

Honohan's (2006:199) question offers an appropriate point of departure: 'What kind of education to foster solidarity among citizens is desirable and legitimate, and to what extent can this accommodate the cultural and religious diversity characteristic of modern societies'? For it links together education and solidarity; the latter defined 'as a commitment to those with whom they may realize or fail to realize the possibility of jointly exercising some collective direction over their lives' (Honohan, 2006:199). The essay also draws from the Council of Europe's programme 'Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education' (EDC/HRE). Key to the programme is the promotion of civic learning, active citizenship and knowledge about democratic values, practices and institutions, by encouraging the young to cultivate a wide range of civic skills, democratic attitudes and a participative political culture (Chryssochoou, 2007:11-14). It also raises awareness about

human rights, promotes 'norms of cooperation' (Lavdas, 2012) and provides a dialogical space within which prospective citizens learn how to strengthen the bonds of their democratic symbiosis.

Reconnecting to citizenship education

With citizenship education being subject to revision as a response to emergent demands, new democratic discourses have come into play (Schwartzmantel, 2003; Maynor, 2003; Honohan, 2006; Gunsteren, 2007; Arthur *et al*., 2008; Peterson, 2011; Arthur and Cremin, 2012). Schwartzmantel's (2003:34, 142) call for a 'new republic' argues that 'the aim is to educate citizens or assist them to educate themselves, in that way promoting a demand for new institutions and processes of politics'. In Callan's words (1997:28, quoted in Schwartzmantel, 2003:142): 'A political education that meets the challenge will teach the young the virtues and abilities they need in order to participate completely in reciprocity-governed political dialogue and to abide by the deliverances of such dialogue in their conduct as citizens'. As put by Schwartzmantel (2003:143), 'through such education members of the *polis* or political society will be given the necessary training, in the broadest sense, so that they are able to practice the virtues appropriate to a deliberative and inclusive republic'; an education 'designed to build on and deepen a sense of solidarity and reciprocity' (Schwartzmantel, 2003:143). Honohan (2006:199-200) writes: 'the virtues of solidarity that education should foster are awareness of interdependence, civic self-restraint and deliberative engagement'. 'This solidarity', she continues, 'is distinct from, and not guaranteed by, a sense of cultural identity, but it is grounded in a reflective acceptance of certain obligations and in practical engagement' (Honohan, 2006:204). Similarly, Bellamy (2008:70) asserts:

> Democracy assumes a people, or *demos*, who feel sufficient solidarity with each other to accept collective decisions and enough trust to cooperate. Without solidarity, individuals would be tempted to obey only those collective decisions that benefited them and even then might be inclined to free-ride. Majorities may be unwilling to accommodate minorities, minorities to accept majority decisions.

Or, in Maynor's (2003:176) terms, reflecting on Gutmann's (1987) work:

> So that individuals are prepared for the active role they must play in maintaining their own liberty, education must be structured in such a

> manner that they have access to a common language of citizenship and the capacity to involve themselves actively in public affairs.

As to the idea of what a 'democratic citizen' is, Kazamias (2012:23) writes:

> The democratic citizen is the active citizen who possesses: a) the necessary political literacy, namely, the required knowledge and understandings on the nature and functioning of the modern democratic polity as well as on his/her rights and duties, and b) equally important, the skills (i.e., critical *nous*/thinking), civic virtues, dispositions and values (i.e., justice, solidarity, tolerance, cooperation, sensitivity, prudence [*fronesis*] and, according to Aristotle, "friendship" [*filia*]. In other words, s/he is characterized by "critical spirit", "democratic ethos" and "democratic consciousness".

This Athenian-inspired portrait of the democratic citizen is also reminiscent of the *civis bonus* of classical Rome as well as of the Italian 'city-republics' (Skinner, 1992), thus confirming Honohan's (2006:204) broader assertion: 'From a republican perspective, citizens need civic virtues because realizing freedom and the common good depends on their mutual commitments'. But lets us now turn to the recent past.

In October 1997, the Council of Europe's leaders decided to launch a project called 'education for democratic citizenship'. Its principal aims were to: 'Strengthen democratic societies by fostering and perpetuating a vibrant democratic culture; Create a sense of belonging and commitment to democratic society; Raise awareness of shared fundamental values and thus build a freer, more tolerant European Society' (Kerr, 2005:12). Gollop and Krapf (2008:5) capture the wider picture:

> An open pluralist society relies on a set of binding rules and strong institutions to enforce these rules, but perhaps even more on a shared set of values among the citizens. These values include tolerance, mutual respect, appreciation of fair compromise, non-violence, and the ability to deal with open situations of disagreement and controversy in which issues have not yet been decided.

And so does Kerr (2005:11-12):

> The EDC project was seen as a *central political priority* for the Council and its member states because of its relevance to the Council's core

> mission to strengthen pluralist democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Education for democratic citizenship (EDC) is defined by the Council of Europe as a *set of practices and activities* for equipping young people and adults to play an active part in democratic life and exercise their rights and responsibilities … The project is multi-dimentional, inclusive and promotes a lifelong perspective. It is based on *capacity building*, networking and the sharing of information and practices across all age groups and social classes …

In Cavafian tone, he writes that the programme (Kerr, 2005:26-27):

> is about creating and valuing '*active citizenship journeys*' where the process of travel is as important as reaching the end of the journey. EDC is not just what you learn about democratic culture along way but also about how and where you learn it. This means carefully balancing the development not just of knowledge and understanding but also of skills and dispositions. You cannot learn about citizenship and democracy in isolation but must have '*real opportunities*' to put that learning into practice and, as a result, to negotiate the limits of that practice.

The programme's focuses on the role citizenship education plays in public life and, since the mid-2000s, on social cohesion, teacher training and 'democratic school governance' (Zakroczymska, 2006:8). On 11 May 2010, the Council's Committee of Ministers adopted an EDC/HRE Charter in order to promote further the programme's work (Council of Europe, 2010). The Charter states (Council of Europe, 2010:7):

> "Education for democratic citizenship" means education, training, awareness-raising, information, practices and activities which aim, by equipping learners with knowledge, skills and understanding and developing their attitudes and behaviour, to empower them to exercise and defend their democratic rights and responsibilities in society, to value diversity and to play an active part in democratic life, with a view to the promotion and protection of democracy and the rule of law.

As to human rights education, the Charter aims 'to empower learners to contribute to the building and defence of a universal culture of human rights in society, with a view to the promotion and protection of human rights and

fundamental freedoms' (Council of Europe, 2010:7). It is argued that the whole idea 'is not just equipping learners with knowledge, understanding and skills, but also empowering them with the readiness to take action in society in the defence and promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law' (Council of Europe, 2010:9). Moreover, the Charter points out: 'All means of education and training, whether formal, non-formal or informal, have a part to play in this learning process and are valuable in promoting its principles and achieving its objectives' (Council of Europe, 2010:9).

It all comes down to the idea of citizens taking responsibility for exercising their political liberty and for valuing the liberty of others as much as that of their own and of the community to which they belong. As Karakatsani (2004:5) notes: 'The role of political education becomes particularly important, especially with regard to the development of appropriate ways of thinking, judgement and action, the acquisition and consolidation of a political consciousness which would allow the preservation of social cohesion on the basis of knowledge, respect, acceptance and tolerance of cultural differences'; a task central to the democratic life of plurinational polities. Also, according to the Huddleston Report (2008:7): 'In considering the advantages of partnership working in this field, participants distinguished between three different reasons for bringing together state and non-state action: pragmatic, educational and critical'. Underlying these efforts is a belief that Europe needs to develop a sense of plural 'demos-hood' which accommodates multiple forms of democratic symbiosis and moves beyond conventional citizenship practices. Soltan (1999:2) writes:

> To contrast it with citizenship as a bundle of rights, let us call it citizenship as a state of mind. Citizenship in this sense is also a form of membership in a collectivity, but this time defined not by the formal rights that come with membership, but rather by the knowledge, motives, ideals, abilities, and skills associated with it. Citizenship as a state of mind can be identified with political competence, the mental qualities required for successful participation in government.

She also adds (Soltan, 1999:2-3): 'Citizenship as a state of mind is then also a political recourse. It involves the capacity to make proposals that will gain support because they are appealing on their merits, and not because of the capacity of the proposers to spread their message, reward their supporters, or punish their opponents'. Citizenship education promotes responsible choices along the lines of *audi alteram partem*, so that 'people can be reasonably led to incommensurable and incompatible understandings of values and interests, and seeing the need to engage with them in terms they can accept' (Bellamy

and Castiglione, 2000:182). This accords with Gutmann's (1987:577; quoted in Maynor, 2005:176) plea for learning how to 'evaluate different political perspectives that are often associated with different ways of life'. 'In other words', writes Maynor (2005:177), 'future citizens need the ability to reflect critically on the many different, and sometimes incompatible, values held by a population defined by diversity'. Gutmann's conception, he continues, 'relies on an attempt to foster mutual respect among citizens' (Maynor, 2005:176). To conclude (Maynor, 2005:177): 'The teaching of civic virtue helps future citizens to attain the ability to engage in fair and just political reflection that is an intractable feature of today's modern polity'. Such dispositions, whether of a liberal or of a republican kind, question unprincipled or uncritical learning practices and self-centred attitudes within a 'polycultural' setting (Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2007). Honohan (2006:205) notes:

> Citizens need to develop *civic self-restraint*. This is less a matter of learning to defer gratification than of giving more weight to common interests than prevails in the contemporary culture of individualism. But it may be understood as an expansion, or re-identification, of the self or individual interests in a broader sense, rather than as self-denial, or as a calculation of the balance of interests … Active self-restraint implies an orientation to challenge infringements not only of one's own rights, but also of others.

Turning to Maynor (2005:180), he argues that 'without sufficient levels of education and virtues, the laws and institutions of the republic suffer, resulting in the rise of corruption and the loss of liberty'. He explains (Maynor, 2005:181): 'Without widespread civic virtue and citizenship, there is a risk that individuals who promote their own private interests at the expense of the common good will inevitably drive the instruments of state power'; 'civic virtue' defined as 'the ability to treat others in civility' (Maynor, 2005:182). His preferred model 'asks individuals to not only tolerate and respect citizens but to engage them' so that 'individuals are better able to cast their ends in a nondominating manner and treat them with civility in the hope that they will be treated likewise' (Maynor, 2005:183). In sum (Mayor, 2005:186):

> Modern republican civic education teaches the necessary values and virtues that help individuals and groups to ensure that their life choices do not interfere arbitrarily with others, just as it teaches others to how not to dominate their life choices. Thus, the primary goal of a republican approach to civic education is the inculcation

> of values and virtues aimed at teaching individuals the necessary skills of nondomination and how to case and express their ends in a nondominating fashion.

All the above stress the importance of equipping young people with a capacity to value disagreement and to form judgements on the basis of critical reflection and dialogical practices; and all that, by experiencing a civic education that promotes, to borrow from Pettit (2005), a 'democracy of ideas'. As Bellamy (2008:122-123) states:

> Citizenship informs and gives effect to central features of our social morality. It underlies our whole sense of self-worth, affecting in the process the ways we treat others and are treated by them. It stands behind the commitment to rights and the appreciation of cultural diversity that are among the central moral achievements of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

A conceptual mosaic

Democracy, defined by Tsatsos (2009:12) as 'an honest deduction of power *to the will of the people*', is a method of organizing public life in ways which reflect and address the concerns of the demos. Tsatsos (2009:12) writes: 'The actual function of the demos both in the historical evolution and contemporary polymorphic –actual or otherwise– democracies is not always the same, or equal, always that politically earnest'. Yet, it remains '[t]he archaic and yet diachronically enduring and widely acceptable core of Democracy' (Tsatsos, 2009:12). In short, respect for individual and collective liberties through the rule of law –or, in Tsatsos' words (2009:16), through 'the subordination of political conditions to established rules'– and civic inclusion are democracy's defining properties. To quote again from Tsatsos (2009:14): 'From the point of view of the citizen, this means that s/he can participate as a primary political subject in all the political echelons in which the demos is recognized and autonomous from other entities of the legal order'. In that sense also, he writes: 'The democratic principle is not only procedural, but deeply essential … its content has a normative quality based on values' (Tsatsos, 2009:15). To conclude (Tsatsos, 2009:18-19):

> The political recognition of the demos as the only source of power means that the sum total of citizens who form a unified political group

> constitutes the primary political subject in the process of forming a collective political will. This means in turn, that Democracy, among other things, requires that each citizen is provided with equal means not only *to deliberate*, but *to deliberate freely*. Thus the meaning of Democracy as a process of reduction of power to the demos, has, apart from a regime dimension which refers to the institutional procedure of derivation of state decisions from the demos, a subject-dependent legal dimension, since it presupposes the guarantee of the political freedom of the citizen as member of the primary political subject in the function of the demos. This is to suggest that the democratic power of the demos is only meaningful when it is exercised under an institutional regime of fundamental rights, and, consecutively, of a corresponding system of values which guarantees not only the conventional, but also the actual freedom of the citizen to form [his/her own] will and to deliberate.

Whether one draws from a liberal or republican view of the polity and, hence, from a negative or positive conception of liberty (Berlin, 2002), the dilemma facing contemporary democracies is whether to pursue a strategy for civic empowerment or opt for what Scharpf (1999) calls 'output-oriented legitimacy'. Whatever the preferred line may be, democracy aims to enhance the participative potential of the demos. As Dewey put it (1916:87): 'A democracy is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience'. It points to the dialectical osmosis between a mental (ideational) and a procedural (working) condition –between 'a state of mind', to recall Schattschneider (1969:42, quoted in Adamany, 1960:xii), and an institutional ordering–, allowing citizens to reflect on their democratic symbiosis. Thus democracy refers both to a core set of virtues and the means for embodying them in the workings of public institutions. It also implies 'that citizens must learn about the substantive nature of the institutions of the republic, how they work, how to use them, and, importantly, how to challenge them' (Maynor, 2005:190). As Crick (2002:106) confirms, 'active citizenship demands not just will and skill but some knowledge of institutions, not an abstract or an academic comprehensive knowledge, but a practical knowledge of what levels of power are relevant to particular intentions'.

In a period characterized, as Held *et al.* argue (1999:445), by 'overlapping communities of fate', democracy should not confine itself to state boundaries. For today's 'global plurality' (Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2011) is being shaped by what Kymlicka (2007) termed 'liberal multiculturalism'. Thus democracy needs to keep pace with the reality of regional or global authorities and, in the

case of the European Union (EU) –a union of states and demoi in the sense of Tsatsos' (2009) 'sympolity'– with the emergence of a nascent, yet, as judged by national standards, fragmented demos (Chryssochoou, 1998). Here, the idea of 'transnational democracy' (Anderson, 2000) offers a viable alternative to a global order defined in terms of 'governance without government' (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). Taylor (2002:238-239) asserts:

> Such a relatively complex layered democracy attempts to directly address issues of identity by enabling multiple imagined communities to be formed while assuming the largest scale to be the new community of fate – beyond the "nation-state" – in a globalising world. Does this new relation of communities of the imagination within a larger community of fate make for a viable demos or demos-es? … By splintering the imagined community through multiple identities, is the depth of allegiance –the essence of the concept– lost? With solid community attachments replaced by shallower, multiple attachments, is this a cacophony politics of lowest common denominators? In short, does the effective operation of a demos assume a dominant scale or focus of allegiance? The historical evidence suggests this to be the case.

In composite polities like the EU –defined also as an 'organized synarchy' of co-determined sovereignties (Chryssochoou, 2009)– the embodiment of democratic norms in their working arrangements is crucial for building instruments of democratic shared rule for a plural but civic-minded demos. But this does not require a radical reordering of pre-established structures and cultures or a loss of national democratic autonomy on the part of the member demoi. Rather, it points at a structured plurality of democratic subjects: a 'Republic of Europeans' (Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2011) that promotes mutually reinforcing agreements among diverse but constitutive demoi. In sum, the aim is to transform the democratic potential of EU citizens into an agency of civic change within a liberal-republican setting (Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2009).

Many peoples, one demos

Given that citizenship encourages 'democratic will-formation' (Habermas, 1996) and the demos' capacity to fulfil its civic purpose –in Bellamy's (2008:3) terms, 'to shape and sustain the collective life in the community'– 'civic competence', taken by Soltan (1999:20) as 'a combination of attitudes

and ideals with *skills*', enhances citizens' capacity to develop a shared sense of 'demos-hood' and reflect on ways of improving their civic symbiosis. This can assist in the making of a European *civitas composita* based on the idea of *caritas rei publicae*: on shared notions of belonging to a plurality of interactive demoi (Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2006). *Caritas rei publicae* means 'a caring (or affection) for things public' or, in Viroli's (2002:79) words, 'a charitable love of the republic'. It is the highest form of 'republican patriotism' –to borrow from Bellamy (2008:37), a 'selfless devotion to public duty'– sustained, Viroli's words (2002:18, 80), by 'acts of service (*officium*) and care (*cultus*) for the common good' and 'giving citizens the strength to perform their civic duties and rulers the courage to meet the onerous obligations that defense of the common liberty demands'. In this context, Crick (2002:24) makes a valid point: 'The Romans had their version of *arete*, which they called *virtus*, a word misleading if translated as "virtue" in a modern moral sense: it was the specific virtue or element that a citizen should possess to do whatever was needed for the preservation, expansion, and glory of the state'.

Caritas rei publicae also transcends the idea of exclusive loyalties: 'A person who loves the common liberty of his or her own people also loves and respects the liberty of other people and commits himself or herself to defending it' (Viroli, 2002:17). As Viroli (2002:13-14) explains, such a patriotism 'is first of all a political passion based on the experience of citizenship, not on shared pre-political elements … love of country is not a natural feeling but a passion that needs to be stimulated through laws or, more precisely, through good government and the participation of the citizens in public life'. Mouritsen (2006:20) concurs: 'Patriotism is a sense of solidarity and public spirit, which may motivate people to civic action to protect common liberty'. All the above offers a response to egocentric accounts of politics: 'Passion, commitment, and loyalty seem to have forsaken democracy and to have followed nationalistic and religious demagogues. Republicanism should propose itself in democratic multicultural countries as a new political vision of a civic ethos that reconnects the words "liberty" and "responsibility"' (Viroli, 2002:103).

Europe's republican challenge is to develop a pluralist view of the demos (Lavdas 2001), while addressing 'domination', defined by Pettit (1997:52) as 'a power of interference on an arbitrary basis'. Not that Europe is expected to produce an 'extensive commonality of culture' (Honohan 2002:279); for its legitimacy springs from multiple loyalties drawn from a plurality of democratic publics: 'Since Europe is notoriously marked by diversity of nationality and views of history', writes Honohan (2002:280), 'interdependence of fate and

future can come to be seen as the basis of political community'. Thus a notion of 'civic plurality', to borrow a term from Avnon and Benziman (2010:xv), which, applied to Europe, translates into the dual sense of 'many peoples, one demos'. As Honohan (2002:281) asserts: 'The substance of republican politics is based on interdependence rather than commonality, is created in deliberation, emerges in multiple publics to which all can contribute, and is not definitive but open to change'. Thus also a pluralist-republican depiction of 'a public' (Honohan, 2002:231-232): 'The republican public may be seen in plural terms, as it is disengaged from total identification with the legislative and coercive state ... Rather than demanding a "unified public", it thus lends itself more easily to multiple centres'.

Although the idea of 'civic Europe' holds the promise of a democratic design of plural citizenship for diverse demoi to steer their collective civic orientation, the institutionalisation of civic competence at EU level is yet to be seen in assigning new meaning to citizen-polity relations. Citizenship education in Europe is thus part of the quest for 'the good polity' (Pettit, 1989) as well as of an intellectual current taking the European plurality as an ordered collectivity of distinct but interactive publics: a 'postnational constellation', to recall Habermas (2000), which provides for a dynamic 'polity equilibrium' as well as for a sense of belonging to multiple civic spaces whose dialectical interactions promote 'undominanted' choice for all (Pettit, 1997).

A neglected discourse

What follows focuses on EU party political development as part of a wider discourse on EU demos formation, arguing that a principled dialogue on and among Europarties can facilitate the idea of a plural demos. But why focus on such party structures given the discouraging levels of citizen identification with their workings? – although, this is only a symptom of a larger malaise: 'Disenchantment with democratic politics have never been more pronounced, with voter turnout and trust in politicians in a slow but steady decline within all the established democracies' (Bellamy, 2008:97); not to mention that the EU is far from being an 'established democracy' as 'it has proved impossible to create a *demos* or party democracy' (Bellamy, 2008:120). And yet, Schattschneider (1942:1) wrote some seventy years ago: 'The political parties created modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties'. In a democratic political community –one which invests in the participative potential of the demos–, political parties constitute 'an integral expression of the individuals' right to freely form associations'

and 'the most widely utilized means for political participation and exercise of related rights' (Venice Commission, 2010:6, 8).

Defined as 'a free association of persons, one of the aims of which is to express the political will of citizens' (Venice Commission, 2010:12), a political party helps to bestow citizens with a sense of 'demos-hood'. Thus a corresponding task for Europarties is to ascribe to a fragmented public a sense of 'many peoples, one demos' and offer a clear view of how to keep it together. Here, one should not refer to a unifying notion of demos, but to the horizontal interaction of citizens as members of a discursive polity which addresses real democratic concerns and in which citizens can develop shared understandings of their democratic symbiosis. In that sense also, Europarties can reassign meaning to the Maastricht provision on their potential 'to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union'. This accords with a conception of political parties as 'conveyer belts' or 'preformators' of the citizens' will (Giannakou, 2010:5) as well as with the Lisbon Treaty's renewed commitment to enhancing representative democracy in the EU.

An EU party statute would offer Europarties the opportunity to break away from their national affiliates and introduce innovative means of connecting with the member publics. Here, the idea of transnational party lists would encourage cross-country synergies among candidates standing for European issues, as would the idea of authorizing Europarties to participate in EU-related referenda campaigns. Although this poses a challenge to their capacity to shape the domestic debate, to the extent that they also express the citizens' will, as Maastricht states, they may well be involved in such campaigns 'as long as the subject of the referendum has a direct link with politics at the level of the Union' (Giannakou, 2010:7); an indication that the EU can be taken as 'a polity like any other' (Hix, 1994) and that 'party regulation is always a means to support a higher normative goal (Molenar, 2004:4). For EU party regulation relates to different accounts of 'eurodemocracy', ranging from postnational polity designs to instrumental views of 'democracy' (Nikolaidis, 2004). Europarties can thus be turned into real agents of political will-formation or remain an extension of domestic party politics. Although in-between lies a variety of views, the more the EU rests on its own party structures, the greater its participatory potential. This section linked EU party development with a vision of politics that extends beyond narrowly defined electoral concerns and acknowledges the civic dynamism of Europarties in inducing integrative sentiments and contributing the making of a larger plural demos.

Conclusion

This essay argued the case for European citizenship education based on virtue-centred practices. In the case of Europe, this relates to the search for a civic ethos at the state level and for active citizenship and party political synergies alongside or even beyond that level. But it also relates to the question posed by Ignatieff (2000:265) of whether Europe can act as 'a community united in a common argument about the meaning, extent and scope of liberty'. The answer, it was argued, lies in the idea of a 'Republic of Europeans' (Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2011) inspired by a sense of plural demos-hood which is still part of a great European democratic tradition. Crick's (2002:115) way of canvassing his hopes for a republican revival offers an appropriate conclusion:

> The main motive may be to restore or create *good* citizenship but generally it is realized that that can only be a welcome by-product of learning *active* citizenship, aiming to empower young people … Even in the heart of consumer societies, even with the dispiriting examples set by those in public life, there is this small mediating tendency, potentially important; or at least a sign that the ideas of civic republicanism in the context of democratic institutions are, if not in the ascendancy, not yet vanquished by any means, as the historian of ideas implies.

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Περιληψη

Το άρθρο εξετάζει τη σχέση μεταξύ παιδείας και δημοκρατίας και, αντλώντας από τη ρεπουμπλικανική πολιτική θεωρία, διερευνά τη δημοκρατική δυναμική του πρώτου πανευρωπαϊκού προγράμματος για την «Παιδεία της Δημοκρατίας» με στόχο την ενθάρρυνση των νέων να συμμετέχουν στη δημόσια ζωή σε κοινωνικό και σχολικό επίπεδο. Επίσης, επανεξετάζει τη δυναμική των ευρωπαϊκών πολιτικών κομμάτων και τις δυνατότητες συμμετοχής που προσφέρουν. Όλα τα παραπάνω μπορούν να συμβάλλουν στη διαμόρφωση μιας *civitas Europaea*, αποτελούμενης από πολλαπλά δημοκρατικά κοινά με συνείδηση της συλλογικής πολιτικής τους ταυτότητας.